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iscussions of health policy are becoming heated once again. Business-including members of The Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce-is looking at its own internal policies. Washington is talking competition versus regulation. States are wrestling with Medicaid costs. Local coalitions (which may be comprised of business representatives, providers, labor leaders, and others) are contemplating filling gaps left by declining federal regulatory efforts. Nearly everyone agrees that the question is whether increased spending has occured without equivalent improvements in access to, or quality of, health care. What is not clear is the potential cost of various proposed remedies compared with the cost of the problem. Particularly unclear is whether mechanisms for controlling provider prices are among the desirable alternatives for either public or business policy.
The appropriate interpretation of price behavior during the recent inflationary period has been problematic in many industries, including health care. Expenditures in health care increased from 6.1 percent of gross national product in 1965 to 9.8 percent in 1981. 1 Such rapid increases have intensified political pressure, as well as business and community pressures, to "control the rising cost of health care." Proposals for direct regulation of health care prices have gained some popularity as one policy alternative.
The evaluation of health care prices and spending requires an important but somewhat difficult distinction between the per unit prices of health care goods and services and the total cost of treatment. Health care products and units of service (a physician visit, a prescription, a lab test, a nurse for a workshift) are actually inputs used in the treatment of particular health problems or conditions. Treatment costs may rise because (1) the unit prices of health care goods or services increase, (2) the quantity or quality of health care goods or services used for the treatment of a particular health condition increases, or (3) totally new procedures, products, and services become available and are used.
Similarly, perceived excessive rates of increase in treatment costs may reflect excessive rates of increase in health care product and service prices and/ or unnecessary, and therefore wasteful, increases in rates of health care product and service consumption. Although this analysis focuses on the behavior of health care product and service prices, it is not meant to imply that rates of consumption are not important as an aspect of cost efficiency in health care delivery or as a cause of increased expenditure. In fact, patterns of health care consumption may be the most effective target for public and business policy.
A meaningful evaluation of price-regulation policies, as they relate to the objectives of increasing efficiency and moderating the rate of increase of health care costs, raises two analytical questions: (1) To what extent has health care price inflation contributed to the increase in health care spending; and (2) What have been the causes of rising health care prices?
A sustained period of economywide inflation adds "noise" to the price determination process and to consumer-analyst judgment of it, by imposing a set of price pressures that are external to individual markets. Most economists agree that the general inflation in the United States in the period 1965-81 was caused largely or almost entirely by a combination of government monetary and fiscal policy actions, with some additional contribution from structural changes in the US. economy, "economic shocks," and international events-all causes outside the control of any particular economic sector or industry.
A point to be emphasized during the development and evaluation of public and business policy is that price controls applied to particular goods and services cannot reduce these economywide inflationary pressures. Attempts to control particular prices subject to such pressures run the extreme risk of causing serious problems within the controlled industries-especially medium-and long-term problems of supply. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the contributions of general and sector-specific inflationary pressures to changes in an economic sector's prices (sectoral prices).
Health Care Prices And Spending
The first of the two public or business policy questions proposed earlier involves the contribution of health care price inflation to rising health care spending. Expenditure in any economic activity is determined by the levels of price per unit, utilization per capita, and population size. That is, E = P U N, where E = total dollar expenditure, P = price per unit, U = utilization per capita, and N = population size.
By applying Denison's widely accepted methodology of accounting for economic growth, it is possible to quantify the contributions of P, U, and N to changes in E. 2 This has been done for year-to-year changes of expenditures in twelve health care sectors, and the year-to-year changes have been aggregated to changes over longer periods. The basic data concerning annual expenditure levels are U.S. government estimates and are reported in the National Health Expenditure series. 3 The set of price indices used in the calculations reported here follows the specification employed by the U.S. Health Care Financing Administration in its pub-HEALTH CARE PRICES 91 lished analyses. 4 Consumer Price Index (CPI) components were thus used for all categories of professional services and for health care goods. The National Hospital Input Price Index and the National Nursing Home Input Price Index were applied to the hospital and nursing home sectors respectively. 5 The contributions of P, U, and N to changes in total health care spending during the periods 1965-81, 1965-72, and 1972-81 are reported in Exhibit 1. Sources of change in expenditure for the individual health care sectors are shown in Exhibit 2. Among the important facts to be seen in this analysis is that changes in price account for a significant portion of changes in health care spending. For example, it accounts for over 68 percent of the increase in total health care expenditure in 1972-81. There is, therefore, a need to examine the causes of this health care price inflation. 
Imposed Inflation And Health Care Prices
How should prices have behaved-during the 1965-81 period? This is the kind of question that many businesses and industries have been asked, especially in recent years.
It is apparently a natural tendency to compare any economic sector's rates of price change with the economywide average inflation rate. Higherthan-average rates of change are often used as evidence of "excessive" price increases. Such relative price increases have been attributed to some social perversity in health care markets, for example, and have become the basis for price-control proposals.
It is incorrect, however, to assume that all relative price changes, as reflected in differential rates of inflation, arise because of socially undesirable forms of resource utilization. The assumption in simple comparisons of sectoral with economywide average inflation rates is that competitive behavior should lead to equal inflation rates in all sectors. The fact is that sectoral inflation rates will equalize only if resource productivities, particularly labor productivity, change at the same rate in all sectors. In the absence of that condition, sectoral inflation rates should be expected to vary inversely with sectoral changes in productivity.
Exhibit 2 Sources Of Change In Health Care Expenditure (Billions of Dollars)
a Other professional services, other health services, expense for prepayment and administration, government public health activities, research, and medical facilities construction.
In health care production, as in most service and labor-intensive industries, measured productivity gains have lagged behind the economywide average.
7 Therefore, economywide inflationary pressures have more impact on most health care prices than on the prices of manufactured goods, for instance. A realistic comparative price standard should account for this uneven impact of general inflation by accommodating differences in resource productivity and resource mix.
The full impact of general inflationary pressure on the price level of a particular sector is referred to here as "imposed inflation." Any residual of actual sectoral price inflation over that which is imposed by general inflationary pressure -this residual to be referred to as "specific inflation" -can then reasonably be attributed to forces or characteristics that are peculiar to the individual sector. Therefore, specific inflation represents the component of sectoral price behavior that might be a candidate for elimination through sectoral price controls.
In a recently published article, we have developed a general model and method for the heuristic estimation of an imposed rate of price inflation for any economic sector. 8 The method is based on the following premises:
1. In today's economy, wages tend to rise at similar. rates across all sectors and geographic areas. (Please note that changes in any sector's relative level of wages during a period of time thus cause a part of the sector's specific inflation rate.) 2. Imposed changes in labor cost in any sector result from changes in the economywide rate of change in wages lessened by any reasonably expected increase in the productivity of labor in that sector. 3. When costs rise together across all parts of an economic sector, prices of the sector's output tend to rise similarly. The model thus asserts that any sector's prices can be expected to follow changes in its labor costs, weighted by the relative importance of the cost of labor in the sector, and changes in the costs of other inputs to the sector weighted by their relative importance. An implication of the model would be that across the entire economy-since the great bulk of all economywide costs are labor costs-an index of prices such as the GNP deflator would closely track an index of the cost of labor. Just such evidence has been found. 9 In effect, then, this model of imposed inflation asserts that a sector's prices will change relative to general price level changes if its relative labor intensity is different from average and/ or its relative labor productivity growth is less or more than average.
In order to identify the sources of health care price increases, an imposed inflation rate was calculated for each health care sector. For all sectorsboth goods and services-the wage index used was the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) measure of economywide change in private sector wage rates. For each sector, the weight for the relative cost of labor (its "labor intensity") was calculated as an average for the period of the ratio of sector labor costs to total sector costs.
The labor productivity benchmark used for the computation of imposed inflation in the health care service sectors (hospitals, nursing homes, and professional services) was "private sector productivity less farm and manufacturing." 10 This index provides a measure of labor productivity over a range of service-oriented economic activities. The implied expectation or assumption is that health services should have achieved the average productivity gain experienced for all private sector services. This would seem to be a reasonable expectation for useful public or business policy analysis. However, since the measurement of specific inflation is uniquely related to the measures of productivity (especially labor productivity) used, any value of these data for public or business policy purposes depends upon one's willingness to accept the validity of this expectation or assumption.
Medical care goods fit into the broad category of "nondurable goods manufacturing less food and fuels."
11 Therefore, labor productivity for this industrial segment was used as the standard for the computation of imposed inflation of prices of medical care goods. It was explicitly assumed, as it was for the service-intensive sectors, that other input productivities, including capital, changed, as did the economywide average for those inputs. 12 Specific inflation in each sector is calculated from the price indices representing total price change and imposed inflation. For example, if a sector's actual price inflation from one year to the next was 5 percent, while the calculated rate of imposed inflation was 4 percent, then this sector's specific inflation for that year would be about 1 percent. Based on such calculations, contributions of imposed and specific inflation to changes in health care spending are shown in Exhibit 3 in both percentage and dollar amounts. Exhibit 4 provides details of the contributions of specific inflation in each subsector of personal health care spending during the 1965-81 period. Exhibit 5 shows the dollar contributions of imposed, specific, and total inflation for each subsector of total health care spending from the most recent time period studied.
The total specific inflation of health care prices thus measured accounts for 5.52 percent of the change in total U.S. health care spending during 1965-81. Specific inflation was responsible for a substantially smaller percent of expenditure increase in the 1972-81 period (4.81 percent) than in the 1965-72 period (8.19 percent). This observation is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the introduction of Medicare/ Medicaid in 1966 led to an immediate increase in relative health care prices but that the effect on relative health care prices was moderated during the longer period as capacity adjustments occurred.
These results have one primary implication for health care pricecontrol policy, whether in the public or private sector. Even if price Results of these calculations for six reported sectors (other professional services, other health services, expense for prepayment and administration, government public health activities, research, and medical facilities construction) were summed and reported as "other" for these purposes. Price-regulation proposals have not focused on these sectors.
controls had effectively eliminated all specific inflation from 1965 to 1981 and had done so with absolutely no direct or indirect social costs, the net benefit to society in 1981 would have been a savings of only $13.5 billion, or about 4.7 percent, in a total national health care bill of $286.6 billion.
Specific Inflation And Health Care Prices
During the 1970s there were, of course, a number of attempts at price controls impacting on health care industries at least as heavily as on the rest of the economy. The results were largely frustration and perhaps even higher total costs. If this methodology and these data are valid, it is unlikely that price controls, or indeed any regulatory device, could have effectively eliminated all specific inflation in those years. This observation emerges from an examination of some causes of the measured specific inflation.
The hospital sector has been a primary target for price regulation. It has exhibited a greater contribution of specific inflation to changes in health care expenditure than has any other sector. However, as revealed in Exhibit 3, hospital-specific inflation as a source of change in total expenditure was of significantly less relative importance during the 1972 to 198 1 period than during 1965-72 (about 4.0 percent of the increase in total health care spending compared with about 5.5 percent). Hospitalspecific inflation during 1972-81 very likely occurred, in part, because: l3 1. Hospital unit labor costs increased at an average annual rate 16.6 percent higher than the benchmark rate used to calculate imposed inflation. This extra increase in labor costs explains $5.1 billion of changes in hospital-sector expenditure due to specific inflation. Although hospital wages rose at a relatively rapid rate, available evidence suggests that the level of hospital wages has been, and perhaps still is, below the economywide average for similar skills. 14 2. Hospital malpractice premiums increased at an average annual rate four times higher than the rate of increase in the GNP deflator. This accounts for $.9 billion of the expenditure change due to hospitalspecific inflation. 3. Food and utilities prices paid by hospitals rose at average rates that were 29 percent and 66 percent more rapid than the rate of increase in the GNP deflator. These increases account for $1.0 billion of the change in hospital expenditure. These three factors, thus, could explain all but $.8 billion (about .3 percent of the change in total health care spending) of increased hospital expenditure due to specific inflation. If so, price controls are not likely to produce a substantial social benefit, since such forces lie largely outside the control of hospital markets and providers.
Physician-specific inflation, another frequent target of price-control policy discussions, accounted for about 1 percent of the increase in total health care expenditure during 1972-81. Two factors that may have contributed to physician-specific inflation were:
1. Although wage levels of nonphysician employees in physician offices increased more slowly than the economywide average, the number of employees per physician increased by 24 percent. 15 The net effect of these two factors accounts for $.6 billion of health care expenditure changes due to physician-specific inflation. It has been argued that much of the increase in nonphysician personnel has resulted from the growth in clerical workloads created by governmental and private insurance payment systems. 2. Physician malpractice insurance premiums rose much more rapidly than the general price level and account for $.75 billion of expenditure changes due to physician-specific inflation. 16 These two elements alone could account for all but $.75 billion of the measured impact of physician-specific inflation during the 1972-81 period.
The negative values for the effect of specific inflation in three of the sectors indicate that actual inflation rates were below the rates imposed on those sectors. In the case of drugs and sundries, the negative value is probably largely a result of rapid increases in pharmaceutical industry productivity. Pharmaceutical industry productivity during 1972-81 increased at an average annual rate 44 percent higher than that for all manufacturing, thus moderating increases in unit labor costs.
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The negative value for dentist-specific inflation may be explained, in part, by increased productivity brought about by the expanded use of dental assistants. There is also some evidence to indicate that real returns to dentists fell, relative to other labor-income returns, during the 1972-81 p e r i o d . 1 8 
Public And Business Policy Implications
The increasing costs of medical care have become a major concern of political and business leaders, as well as health care providers. In businesses, this concern is seen in the more active participation of benefits managers in community and national medical care matters. The need for other management involvement, including senior management, is evidenced by the increased -activity of organizations like the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in medical care policy deliberations. The activities of individuals and their organizations include considering the establishment of mechanisms of intervention into the health care system. It is the purpose of this paper to provide data and analysis useful to those who have to make these public and business policy decisions.
The technique for separating the effects of general inflation from sectorally generated inflation (specific inflation) could be a potentially useful tool in the analysis of the appropriate types of business involvement in the medical care system. Using reasonable data and applying it to the health care sector suggests that health care prices have behaved in recent years much as should have been expected, given the general inflationary environment. Therefore, it should not be expected that health care price controls could yield a significant social dividend.
Several important limitations of this conclusion deserve comment. First, these findings apply to the rates of change in health care spending and prices, not to their levels. An alternative form of analysis, probably involving subjective value judgments, would be required in order to formulate conclusions about optimal price levels in health care markets.
The analytical technique suggested and applied in this paper requires appropriate judgment in the selection of some empirical variables. The choices made for this study were consciously conservative and, if anything, tend to overstate the impact of specific inflation-with the possible exception of hospital prices, discussed earlier. At the same time, another specification could yield somewhat different results, although other reasonable selections would probably not alter the relative magnitudes that were observed. Rough sensitivity testing reveals a range of possible error of ±3 percent in the dollar estimate of the contribution of specific inflation to changes in total health care spending from 1965 to 1981 as other reasonable wage and productivity measures are used to calculate imposed inflation.
This analysis has not included a discussion of the societal costs of implementing sectoral price controls. A complete analysis of net social benefit should recognize that price controls require the diversion of real economic resources into an administrative control system. Additional resources may also be used by producers and consumers as they attempt to circumvent the system of controls. At least as importantly, any system of price controls runs the risk of creating resource misallocation and product shortages.
The findings reported here do not imply a "clean bill of health" for the U.S. system of health care delivery. They imply neither a high degree of economic efficiency in the production and distribution of medical care goods and services nor absence of need for changes in either employer policy or public policy as those policies relate to health care and its financing.
On the other hand, these findings should lay to rest any concern about market power in health care markets being a cause of recent price inflation. Had there been sufficient increase in market power to enable providers to escalate prices significantly beyond increases in costs, this methodology would have revealed significant unexplained specific inflation. The absence of such evidence removes any reasonable support for health care sector price controls by those seeking a remedy for perceived market power as a cause of price inflation.
Substantial theoretical and empirical literature, as well as ubiquitou s anecdotal information, suggests that significant inefficiency may have occurred because of the excessive utilization of health care goods and services, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. This possibility is supported by the data in Exhibit 1, which show increased utilization per capita to have been a significant source of rising health care costs. Although many causes of increased utilization have been identifiedrising consumer income, demographic trends, technological advances, HEALTH CARE PRICES 9 9 growth in third-party payments, increased government participation, and even fraud and abuse-their quantitative significance requires further investigation. Either employer or public policy prescriptions designed to improve the cost efficiency of utilization should be based on an understanding of both the possible magnitude of various sources of such inefficiency and the entire spectrum of costs incurred by initiatives to create change.
What this study does indicate is that health care price increases in recent years do not reflect significant inefficiencies in health care production. Therefore, attempts to regulate or control health care prices do not appear to address real sources of inefficiency in health care delivery and are likely to be counterproductive.
